多阶段平台动态防御的Markov演化博弈模型及迁移策略

doi:10.3969/j.issn.1000-1093.2021.08.013

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 为提升持续性和阶段性攻击下平台动态防御效率，提出多阶段平台动态防御的Markov 演化博弈模型和迁移策略。从平台动态防御的网络攻防原理入手，分析平台动态防御的循环性和阶段性特点，进行多阶段平台动态防御的关键参数和收益计算；建立多阶段平台动态防御的Markov 演化博弈模型，针对博弈的阶段性，在总收益计算中引入折现因子和转移概率；在此基础上，研究纳什均衡在多阶段Markov平台动态防御演化博弈中的存在性，给出纳什均衡解和最优迁移策略选取算法。通过示例设计迁移策略的分析流程，仿真结果验证了所提模型和迁移策略的有效性。

关键词: 网络空间安全, 平台动态防御, 演化博弈, 迁移策略

Abstract: Markov evolutionary game model and migration strategy of multi-stage platform dynamic defense are proposed to improve the efficiency of platform dynamic defense under persistent and periodic attacks. The cyclical and phased characteristics of platform dynamic defense are analyzed from the network attack and defense principle of platform dynamic defense, and the key parameters and revenue of multi-stage platform dynamic defense are calculated. Markov evolutionary game model of multi-stage platform dynamic defense is established. According to the stage of the game, the discount factor and transfer probability are introduced into the total revenue calculation. On this basis, the existence of Nash equilibrium in multi-stage Markov platform dynamic defense evolutionary game is studied, and the Nash equilibrium solution and optimal migration strategy selection algorithm are given. Finally, an example is given to design the analysis process of the migration strategy, and the effectiveness of the proposed model and migration strategy is verified by simulation.

Key words: cyberspacesecurity, platformdynamicdefense, evolutionarygame, migrationstrategy

中图分类号:

TP393.081

王刚，王志屹，张恩宁，马润年，陈彤睿. 多阶段平台动态防御的Markov演化博弈模型及迁移策略[J]. 兵工学报, 2021, 42(8): 1690-1697.

WANG Gang, WANG Zhiyi, ZHANG Enning, MA Runnian, CHEN Tongrui. Markov Evolutionary Game Model and Migration Strategies for Multi-stage Platform Dynamic Defense[J]. Acta Armamentarii, 2021, 42(8): 1690-1697.

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